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Introduction
THE #METOO MOVEMENT has cast a new light on confidential
settlement agreements, colloquially known as nondisclosure agree-
ments ("NDAs"). Until recently, confidentiality was considered a non-
negotiable term in the resolution of any discrimination matter, not
only for sexual harassment claims but for all actions brought under
equal employment statutes. Employers thought that if a settlement
was made public, they would be deluged with frivolous claims brought
by disgruntled employees. Further, the accepted wisdom was that con-
fidentiality benefited claimants as well, since a record of litigation
would impede their future employment prospects. The resulting
norm of secret settlements not only protected serial harassers and em-
ployers who repeatedly violated anti-discrimination laws, but also led
the judiciary and the public at large to believe that employment dis-
crimination and harassment largely had been rectified in the
workplace.
With the #MeToo movement, the harm caused by these presump-
tions and norms has been revealed. The victims who breached confi-
dentiality agreements were not only applauded, but also faced no
enforcement action against them. There is some evidence that the
courts, and certainly employers and the public, are taking allegations
of harassment more seriously. State and federal legislators' have
turned their attention to the problem of confidentiality, resulting in
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1. See Alexia Fernandez Campbell, A New House Bill Would Bar Companies from Using
Nondisclosure Agreements To Hide Harassment, Vox (Jul. 18, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://
www.vox.com/2018/7/18/17586532/sexual-harassment-bill-ban-nondisclosure-agree-
ments-ndas-congress-metoo [https://perma.cc/Q5GW-YHXH]. I do not analyze the pro-
posed federal legislation here, since it is unlikely to be adopted.
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the adoption of new laws in twelve states,2 and at least a dozen pend-
ing bills, including federal legislation.3 This Article examines whether
there has been a significant shift in norms relating to the confidential-
ity imperative from the perspectives of both the complainant and the
employer. It also analyzes three of the most significant enacted stat-
utes, all of which have serious limitations and loopholes, and proposes
guiding principles that could serve as a template as more jurisdictions
address this issue.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I consider the various
forms of agreements that have come to be known as NDAs and the
stages of the employer/employee relationship in which they come
into play. Part II analyzes the normative value of confidentiality within
this taxonomy. In Part III, I discuss recent legislation that has at-
tempted to remedy the harm caused by confidentiality agreements.
Finally, I conclude by proposing some legislative guidelines that ad-
dress the deficiencies in current legislation.4
I. Parsing NDAs
Since the dawning of the #MeToo era, the term NDA has been
thrown around indiscriminately to describe various more or less con-
sensual contractual agreements entered into in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances. In this part, I define and parse the term so as to facilitate
the consideration of legal norms and legislative action.
A. The Parties to an NDA
Much of the media attention addressing NDAs has centered on
highly atypical situations involving contracts adopted by a high-profile
public figure or a high net worth individual. These may or may not be
in connection with a potential or actual sexual or intimate relation-
2. Elizabeth A. Harris, Despite #MeToo Glare, Efforts To Ban Secret Settlements Stop Short,
N.Y. TIMEs (Jun. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/arts/metoo-move-
ment-nda.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/A8CM-FAVR].
3. See Legislation on Sexual Harassment in the Legislature, NCSL (Feb. 11, 2019), https:/
/www.ncsl. org/ research/about-state-legislatures/ 2018-legislative-sexual-harassment-legisla-
tion.aspx [https://perma.cc/KU7Q-JWGA].
4. For recent scholarship providing a more theoretical consideration of the confi-
dential settlements, see Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil,
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REv. 311 (2018); Scott Altman, Sexual
Harassment ADAs: Privacy, Complicity, and the Paradox ofBlackmail 19-29 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law
Sch. Legal Studies Paper Series, Working Paper No. 305, 2019); David A. Hoffman & Eric
Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 94 WASH. U. L. REv. 165 (2019).
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ship. These agreements are often unrelated to employment and may
not involve a financial payment.
A typical agreement will prohibit, for good and valuable consider-
ation, the disclosure of private and confidential information which is
not generally known to the public, including emails, texts, and photo-
graphs. Liquidated damages clauses are a common feature. Resolu-
tion of any dispute may be governed by private arbitration.5
Perhaps the most notorious of these agreements that has come to
light involves President Trump and Stormy Daniels, who brought a
declaratory judgment action to invalidate their agreement.6 In addi-
tion to the claim that the agreement was never executed by Trump,
Daniels alleged that the agreement was unconscionable and void as
violative of public policy. 7 That action was eventually dismissed as
moot after the defendants provided a covenant not to sue to enforce
the agreement.8 The Harvey Weinstein scandal also involved multiple
NDAs, some with employees, but others with actors, writers, and mod-
els not in his employ.9
These non-employment-related agreements are governed by gen-
eral principles of contract law and are treated much like trade secret
confidentiality provisions.'0 Most importantly, they cannot protect
against a party reporting criminal activity. But since they do not arise
within an employment relationship, they are not governed by almost
all of the proposed or adopted legislation designed to reform the use
of confidentiality agreements.
Consider, for example, an NDA entered into between a public
figure (a man) and a potential romantic partner (a woman). If their
5. See generally Non-Disclosure Agreement Between Charlie Sheen and Scottine Ross, MSNBC
(Dec. 9, 2015, 8:46 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/non-disclosure-agreement-be-
tween-charlie-sheen-and-scottine-ross [https://perma.cc/7BP3-DXES].
6. Dylan Matthews, Stormy Daniels's Legal Battle Against Trump, Explained, Vox (Mar.
13, 2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/13/17109656/
stormy-daniels-donald-trump-lawsuit-affair-porn-adult-arbitration-michael-cohen-payoff
[https://perma.cc/KE3D-8GKJ].
7. See Michelle Mark, Stormy Daniels Says in Bombshell New Lawsuit that Trump Didn't
Sign Their NDA-And There Could Be Photos from Their Alleged Affair, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 7,
2019, 8:07 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/stormy-daniels-lawsuit-reveals-trump-af-
fair-details-2018-3 [https://perma.cc/86P2-B7J4].
8. Civil Minutes at 2-3, Clifford v. Trump, No. CV 18-02217-SJO (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,
2019).
9. Ishani Nath, The Disturbingly Long List of All the Women Who Have Accused Harvey
Weinstein (So Far), FLARE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.flare.com/celebrity/harvey-wein-
stein-victims/ [https://perma.cc/97P8-6NZ4].
10. Nondisclosure Agreement, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.1aw.cornell.edu/wex/non-
disclosureagreement [https://perma.cc/RV6G-4HY8].
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involvement results in the man sexually assaulting the woman, she
cannot be prevented from reporting the occurrence to the police by
virtue of an NDA. However, prosecution of the matter typically would
be in the sole discretion of the district attorney. Her civil remedies
would be limited to an action for assault, which in many states carries
a two-year statute of limitations." But under current law, if she de-
scribed the event publicly in a tweet or blog for example, a contractual
claim could be brought against her under the NDA.
If the assault or harassment akes place in the employment con-
text, significantly different remedies are available. In 1986, the Su-
preme Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibits sex discrimination in employment, to include sexual
harassment.'2 The Court defined harassment as conduct so severe or
pervasive as to interfere with the terms and conditions of
employment.1 3
Although Title VII permits a victim of harassment or assault to
bring a civil action for damages, the statute contains ome significant
roadblocks. First, the action can be maintained only against the em-
ploying entity, typically a corporation, not the individual harasser.'4
Second, the employer must have fifteen or more employees to be cov-
ered by the statute.15 Third, the employee must file an administrative
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") or a state equal employment agency before bringing an ac-
tion in court.16 Fourth, the administrative charge must be filed within
300 days of the last act of harassment.'7
11. See Sexual Assault Civil Statutes of Limitations by State, FINDLAw, https://in-
jury.findlaw.com/torts-and-personal-injuries/sexual-assault-civil-statutes-of-limitations-by-
state.html [https://perma.cc/T4MJ-59A6].
12. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
13. Harassment is unwelcome conduct that is based on race, color, religion, sex (in-
cluding pregnancy), national origin, age (forty or older), disability, or genetic information.
Harassment becomes unlawful where (1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condi-
tion of continued employment, or (2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create
a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abu-
sive. Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
types/harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/B9QT-UHGL].
14. Gale Burns, Civil Rights: Does Title VZ Permit Claims Against Supervisory Individuals in




15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
16. Id.
17. § 2000e-5(e) (1).
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Some of these limitations can be overcome by relying on state
rather than federal law. Both New York and California permit actions
against individual supervisors under statutory language that refers to
"aiding and abetting."'8 California and New York have both recently
extended their statutes of limitation to three years.'9 Both state stat-
utes also apply to smaller employers. In New York, until the recent
elimination of this provision, an employer had to have four or more
employees-but first the law was amended for sexual harassment
claims to be brought against employers of any size, and now the limit
has been removed altogether.20 California covers employers with five
or more employees but also makes an exception for harassment,
where only one employee is required.21
Even with the more generous provisions of state law, enforcement
still requires an employment relationship between the parties. To cir-
cumvent enforcement, a small or individual employer will often desig-
nate a worker as an independent contractor. Take, for example, the
public figure who hires a personal assistant and proceeds to harass
her. Until recently, the employer could avoid any liability under equal
employment laws because the personal assistant would be defined as
an independent contractor. Again, in the wake of #MeToo, some
states and localities have attempted to address this issue. Regarding
harassment, California law covers any person "providing services pur-
suant to a contract."22 Moreover, California recently adopted legisla-
tion that makes it more difficult for employers to classify employees-
particularly gig workers-as independent contractors.23 New York City
just extended its equal employment protections to independent con-
tractors and freelancers.24
These various limitations on claims for sexual harassment or as-
sault impact the viability of NDAs. These agreements operate in the
shadow of possible litigation. Any attempt to restrict their enforceabil-
ity has to be contextualized by a consideration of who the parties are
to the agreement. The existence of an employment relationship is the
trigger for most attempts at legislative reform. In the next part, I will
consider how the timing of the agreement affects its enforceability.
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 2019); N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 296 (McKinney 2019).
19. The California SHARE Act went into effect on October 10, 2019. See CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12940 (West 2019).
20. § 296.
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(j) (4) (A) (West 2019).
22. Id.
23. Assemb. B. 5, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
24. N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 172 (2019).
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B. The Timing of an NDA
NDAs can arise at various stages in the employment relationship.
Some employers include NDAs as part of an initial employment con-
tract, letter of understanding, or even as part of an employee manual.
These agreements typically speak in general terms and prohibit the
disclosure of confidential proprietary information learned in the
course of employment. The term NDA may also refer to a non-dispar-
agement agreement, which prohibits the employee from publicly
communicating negative statements about the employer. Agreements
with these terms often state explicitly that the provisions extend be-
yond employment separation. These same provisions are frequently
included in severance agreements, even when there is no dispute in-
volved in the separation. As standard boilerplate provisions, their en-
forceability rarely becomes an issue.
The real concern regarding the use of NDAs centers upon situa-
tions where an employee complains of discrimination, including in-
stances of harassment or assault. Take, for example, the common
scenario in which an employee is subject to sexual advances by a su-
pervisor. Equal employment legislation encompasses conduct ranging
from repeated verbal remarks to forcible rape. How considerations of
confidentiality play out in this context is highly dependent on when a
resolution is reached. Below I examine three stages of settlement: (1)
internal resolution, (2) agency resolution, and (3) judicial resolution.
1. Internal Resolution
Here the employee follows the procedures established by the em-
ployer and reports the conduct through the appropriate channel, typi-
cally to the human resources department. Even the most
unsophisticated employers now have detailed and well-publicized poli-
cies for reporting discrimination and harassment. These were spurred
by two companion Supreme Court decisions that established an af-
firmative defense for employers when they have systems in place to
report harassment and an employee fails to utilize them.25
In the event that the employer perceives it may have some liabil-
ity, it may determine that a monetary settlement is the best solution to
avoid the expense, publicity, and uncertainty of litigation. Not infre-
quently, the employee will consult an attorney, who sends a demand
letter to the employer, thereby prompting negotiation. The agree-
25. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2775 (1998); see also Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
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ment between the employer and employee may involve separation
from employment but will invariably include a confidentiality provi-
sion. Typically, the agreement will prohibit the disclosure of settle-
ment, the monetary payment, and the underlying facts that
precipitated the dispute. In this scenario, there is no public record of
the dispute or the resolution.
2. Agency Resolution
As discussed above, if an employee wishes to pursue a claim be-
yond the internal resolution stage, the next step is filing with a federal
or state administrative agency. Under federal discrimination statutes,
the complainant must exhaust all administrative remedies before com-
mencing a court action.26 If the employee files with the EEOC, the
charge may not be disclosed to the public.27 The EEOC has no adjudi-
cative powers but is required to attempt to conciliate filed charges.
28
The agency has a formal mediation program where investigators at-
tempt to reach settlements, and if there is "reasonable cause to believe
that discrimination has occurred," the parties are invited to partici-
pate in conciliation conferences and discussions.2 9 These routes to
resolution, however, still result in confidential settlements with non-
disclosure provisions if successful. Just as the EEOC charge is pro-
tected from public scrutiny, the existence and terms of a settlement
are as well.
Many state agencies follow similar procedures to settle com-
plaints, ensuring confidentiality to the parties.3 0 Some, however, take
an adjudicatory approach and permit trial-type public hearings,
3 1
which should be considered in the same category as the judicial pro-
ceedings discussed below.
3. Judicial Resolution
When agency resolution fails, the complaining party typically has
a limited window within which to file a complaint in federal or state
26. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-e(5) (2018).
27. See How To File a Charge ofEmployment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMIssION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/howtofile.cfm [https://perma.cc/XDU3-
XLMR].
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-e(5) (2018).
29. Resolving a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://
www.eeoc.gov/employers/resolving.cfm [https://perma.cc/ 3UR8-Z4SG].
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f) (2) (2018).
31. See generally N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292 (McKinney 2019).
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court. Federal law requires the EEOC to issue a "right to sue" letter,
giving the complaining party ninety days to commence an action.32
Once judicial proceedings commence, the basic outlines of the
dispute become a matter of public record. The complaint will contain
the names of the employee and employer. On rare occasions, a court
may permit a pseudonymous filing for the plaintiff if the allegations
are a highly sensitive or intimate,3 3 but the defendant employer's
name is always available. The name of the actual discriminating or
harassing co-worker or supervisor is typically included in the
allegations.
The ability to extract this information has improved in the last
twenty-five years. Until the advent of internet databases, it was virtually
impossible to find all complaints filed against a particular employer.
Now, services such as Pacer or Bloomberg dockets3 4 make it possible
to search for complaints by defendant name, jurisdiction, and type of
action-for example, employment discrimination.3 5
Other aspects of the litigation process have become less transpar-
ent, however. The details of discrimination and harassment allega-
tions come to light in the discovery process: through document
production, interrogatory answers, and depositions. Until the year
2000, many federal district courts required the filing of discovery
materials, and files were available for public viewing at the court-
house. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 amended this process in
2000 to forbid the filing of these materials because of the cost and
burden of maintaining them.3 6 Although the advent of the Cloud
could overcome these issues, there has been no consideration of mak-
ing discovery materials publicly available again.
While allegations are made public in filed complaints, the resolu-
tion of litigation in the employment arena remains largely secret and
invisible to the public. Approximately 5000 discrimination cases are
filed each year in federal court-including state courts the figure is
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-e5 (2018).
33. SeeJoan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants Be Per-
mitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 1 (1985).
34. Dockets Overview, BLOOMBERG L., https://help.bloomberglaw.com/docs/blh-040-
dockets.html#dockets-overview [https://perma.cc/D5WM-NZ8Q].
35. See generally 25 Years Later, PACER, Electronic Filing Continue To Change Courts, U.S.
CTs. (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/12/09/25-years-later-pacer-
electronic-filing-continue-change-courts/ [https://perma.cc/NYY8-EEPU].
36. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5.
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close to 7500.37 It is estimated that between one percent and six per-
cent of these will go to trial.38 Some percentage of cases result in dis-
missals by virtue of summary judgment or Rule 12 motions to
dismiss.3" But the largest group by far-estimates range from sixty per-
cent to seventy-eight percent-appear to result in secret settlements.4 0
These cases are resolved by contractual settlement agreements
that are not part of the court record. All that appears in the docket is
a stipulation of dismissal. As described above, the agreements bar the
plaintiff employee from revealing the fact of the settlement itself, its
amount, and often the underlying facts upon which the complaint was
based.
Ten years before the #MeToo movement, I analyzed at length the
harm created by the secret settlement norm.41 The concern has less to
do with secret settlements protecting serial harassers, since the com-
plaint allegations are public. What is more problematic is that judges
and the general public came to believe that employment discrimina-
tion and harassment were a thing of the past. The cases simply disap-
peared through the device of stipulations of dismissal, without judicial
approval or a record of the details of the resolution. A second distinct
harm is created by the difficulty secret settlements create in valuing
cases. Without settlement data, plaintiffs form unrealistic expectations
based on a few high-profile matters that receive press attention. Fi-
nally, secret settlements spare employers the public censure attached
to significant monetary payment for a discrimination claim. The lack
of public attention vitiates the deterrence function of the discrimina-
tion statutes.
H. Confidentiality Norms by Resolution Stage
In this part, I will consider the competing values and norms for
the employee and the employer at each of the resolution stages out-
lined above: pre-dispute, internal resolution, agency resolution, and
judicial resolution.




39. Sean Captain, Workers Win only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at Trial, FAST
COMPANY (July 31, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-
few-civil-rights-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/JUD5-85CU].
40. Id.
41. See MinnaJ. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REv. 927
(2006).
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At the pre-dispute stage, as discussed above, boilerplate NDAs as
part of employment contracts appear to be proliferating.42 They raise
the question: What right does an employer have to silence its workers?
The old adage tells us that the First Amendment stops at the factory
doors. It is well established that non-governmental employers may
control the speech of its workers inside the workplace and to some
extent outside as well.43 A non-disclosure agreement simply memorial-
izes employer control.
But when it comes to discrimination and harassment, the excep-
tions may overtake the general rule. First, NDAs cannot prevent the
disclosure of criminal conduct. Enforcement of the NDA in these cir-
cumstances would be found violative of public policy and might also
run afoul of state whistleblower protections.44 Even short of criminal
conduct, employees have several additional avenues of protection.
First, Title VII and the related anti-discrimination statutes gov-
erning age and disability, as well as other employee rights statutes
such as the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Fair Labor Stan-
dard Act, contain anti-retaliation protections.45 Thus, regardless of
any NDA, an employee who "opposes" an act that she reasonably be-
lieves is violative of these statutes by complaining internally, to a gov-
ernmental agency, or publicly is entitled to protection. An employer
cannot take any action against he employee that would dissuade a
reasonable person from speaking out.46 Such prohibited actions
would include not only termination, but reductions in position or pay,
or significant workload changes.4 7
42. EJ Dickson, What, Exactly, Is an ADA?, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 19, 2019, 6:17 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/nda-non-disclosure-agreements-
809856/ [https://perma.cc/QB3Q-R4L3].
43. Tom Spiggle, Your Free Speech Rights (Mostly) Don't Apply at Wor, FORBES (Sept. 28,
2018, 9:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2018/09/28/free-speech-work
-rights/#757f4bd438c8 [https://perma.cc/R9FK-DLUR].
44. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740 (McKinney 2019).
45. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2018); Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215 (a), 216 (b) (2018); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 623 (2018); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2018); Fam-
ily Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (2018); Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2018); Rail-
road Employers Act, 45 U.S.C. § 60 (2018).
46. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
47. See Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis of the Legislative Histoy and Administration of the Law, 2 INous. REL. L.J. 1 (1977).
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Second, speaking out about discrimination or harassment may
also be protected by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").4
The NLRA protects the ability of employees to engage in "concerted
activities" for the purpose of "mutual aid and protection" and covers
workers whether or not they are unionized.49 Boilerplate NDAs that
are used to prohibit public statements about discrimination or harass-
ment have been found to violate the NLRA.50
The next stage-internal resolution-perhaps raises the most dif-
ficult questions of competing norms and values. A settlement reached
at this stage is a purely private contract negotiated outside the pen-
dency of agency or judicial oversight. It is an exchange of money for
silence. There are those who posit that employees, as much as employ-
ers, seek confidentiality at this stage. Employees may want to move on
with their careers without the stigma attached to making waves or litig-
iousness. And employers may agree to settle for reasons having noth-
ing to do with the legitimacy of the claim simply to avoid litigation. If
both parties enter into the agreement freely and without coercion, it
is no different from settlements that are reached regarding many
other harms-for example, medical malpractice. The public may have
an interest in the underlying facts and the settlement amount, but the
same can be said for the substance of many contracts.
One caveat should be considered in relation to the enforceability
of NDAs in this context. General principles of contract law relating to
unconscionability might apply to void NDAs in some circumstances.
This defense to enforcement applies when one party is highly disad-
vantaged in the negotiation (for example, if an employee was denied
the opportunity to consult with a lawyer) or the terms are grossly one-
sided (for example, a million-dollar liquidated damages clause for a
breach).51
Nevertheless, accepting the general legitimacy of NDAs at the
pre-filing internal resolution stage may have some salutary effect if the
norm of confidentiality ceases to apply thereafter. If employers have
no guarantee that they can negotiate secrecy after the point at which
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2018). See also Emma J. Roth, Is a Nondisclosure Agreement
Silencing You From Sharing Your 'Me Too' Story? 4 Reasons It Might Be Illegal ACLU (Jan. 24,
2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/
nondisclosure-agreement-silencing-you-sharing-your-me-too [https://perma.cc/DHF2-
TQ3H].
49. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (2018).
50. See generally Phoenix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. 510 (2002).
51. Hill, supra note 47, at 8-9.
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an administrative charge is filed, the incentive to settle early in the
process would be substantial.
At the federal agency stage, and in most cases at state agencies as
well, proceedings-both complaints and resolutions-are entirely
shielded from public access. The policy justification presumably is tied
to encouraging settlement. The agency process was conceived as a
simple, expeditious, and inexpensive way to resolve discrimination
claims,52 under which complainants could proceed without legal rep-
resentation, and agency personnel would investigate and conciliate.53
In actuality, however, the EEOC is overwhelmed with charges-more
than 75,000 were filed in fiscal year 2018,54 and the agency has a back-
log of close to 50,000 matters.55 The average time to complete an in-
vestigation is ten months. While the agency is authorized to take
meritorious claims that it cannot resolve to federal court, it brought
only 199 cases in 2018.56 Many attorneys who represent employees at
this stage decide to bypass the EEOC process entirely. After 180 days,
a complainant can seek a "right to sue" letter and proceed to court.5 7
Employers also do not necessarily take the EEOC investigatory proce-
dures seriously since few cases are actively pursued.
The EEOC has recently taken a more proactive approach to ad-
dressing harassment in the workplace. It convened a task force that in
2016 made numerous recommendations concerning training, investi-
gations, leadership, and accountability.58 In 2018, after the #MeToo
revelations, the EEOC held a hearing to renew efforts to prevent har-
assment.5 9 But it has done nothing about its black box procedures.
I, along with other scholars, have suggested that, at the very least,
the EEOC should collect and make available aggregate data concern-
ing charges filed against particular employers. Ian Ayres6 o and Samuel
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2018 Enforcement and Litigation Data, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OP-




57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-e (5) (2018).
58. CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EmP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,




60. Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REv 76, 76 (2018).
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Estreicher61 have both proposed schemes by which the agency would
establish an information escrow of harassers, which would be released
upon repeated charges.
Whatever the specifics, the agency process should allow for some
form of intermediate level of confidentiality. For example, for larger
employers, it could make public the number of charges filed and how
they were resolved. In fact, the EEOC does make a determination in
many cases of "no probable cause" to believe a violation occurred. Em-
ployers would have the benefit of vindication in these matters. On the
other hand, there would be a public record of employers with re-
peated filings and determinations of probable cause. This intermedi-
ate level of confidentiality should not deter individual settlements.
At the court filings stage, I have argued that confidentiality in
discrimination actions is wholly contrary to the legislative intent of the
anti-discrimination statutes and also creates negative externalities, as
discussed above. Transparency here does nothing to protect the em-
ployee since the complaint is already a matter of public record and
can be easily discovered through a database search. It is only the em-
ployer who benefits from a confidential settlement.
Employers insist on the importance of keeping settlements secret,
believing that they will be deluged with similar actions from disgrun-
tled employees. A lack of confidentiality available in court would in-
centivize employers to seek resolution at the agency level.
There is nothing out of the ordinary in requiring settlement
agreements to be a matter of public record. When the EEOC brings
an action, its internal rules prohibit secret settlement.6 2 When state
and local governments reach settlements, these also become publicly
available.63 In an analogous area of employee rights, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which governs minimum wage and overtime pay, re-
quires. that all settlements be approved by the court, thus placing the
agreement on the publicly available docket.64








63. See Jon Campbell, New York Paid $1 IM in Harassment Settlements Since '08, DEMO-
CRAT & CHRON. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/
politics/albany/2018/02/22/database-new-york-paid-1 1-m-harassment-settlements-since-
08/330942002/ [https://perma.cc/3CB8-N6J8].
64. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216 (2018); see generally Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States,
679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Stripping discrimination settlements of confidentiality could be
accomplished by various means: an amendment o the underlying fed-
eral or state discrimination statutes; separate federal legislation; an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; a provision in
local court rules; or agency rules. Consideration of each of these ave-
nues is beyond the scope of this Article, but in the following part, I
will analyze several state statutory attempts to address this issue.
I. State Statutes Addressing Confidentiality
In the wake of #MeToo, a number of states have attempted to
address the secrecy surrounding workplace harassment settlements
that came to public attention. Various states have enacted bills, and
legislation is pending in a number of others.6 5 Many of the statutes
are poorly conceived, do not actually remedy the issue, or are under
inclusive. In this part, I will consider the statutes enacted in three
states: New York, California, and New Jersey.
A. New York
New York was the first state to enact legislation addressing confi-
dential settlements. The original statute, passed in 2018,66 provided:
[N]o employer . .. shall have the authority to include or agree to
include in [a settlement agreement] . . . the factual foundation for
which involves sexual harassment, any term or condition that
would prevent the disclosure of the underlying facts and circum-
stances to the claim or action unless the condition of confidentiality is
the complainant's preference.6 7
In August 2019, New York enacted additional legislation expanding
this provision to cover all claims of "discrimination," and not just "sex-
ual harassment."6 8
To satisfy the "plaintiffs preference" exception, an employee
"shall have twenty-one days to consider" an agreement containing a
non-disclosure provision, and even where the employee xecutes the
agreement because such a provision "is the plaintiffs preference," the
65. See Legislation on Sexual Harassment in the Legislature, supra note 3.
66. Blythe E. Lovinger & Jonathan A. Wexler, New York State and City Pass Sweeping
Anti-Sexual Harassment Laws Amid #MeToo, NAT'I. L. RE-v. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/new-york-state-and-city-pass-sweeping-anti-sexual-harass-
ment-laws-amid-metoo [https://perma.cc/NB2M-ERUP].
67. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-336 (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added).
68. S.B. 6577, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Assemb. B. 8421, 2019-2020
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
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employee will be permitted to "revoke the agreement" for a period of
seven days after the employee's execution.6 9
New York's law also addresses pre-dispute NDAs, providing:
[A] ny provision in a contract or other agreement between an em-
ployer or an agent of an employer and any employee or potential
employee of that employer ... that prevents the disclosure of fac-
tual information related to any future claim of discrimination is
void and unenforceable unless such provision notifies the em-
ployee or potential employee that it does not prohibit him or her
from speaking with law enforcement, the equal employment op-
portunity commission, the state division of human rights, a local
commission on human rights, or an attorney retained by the em-
ployee or potential employee.70
There are several positive aspects of the New York statute. First,
and mostly importantly, the Legislature realized the need to address
confidential settlements pertaining to all forms of discrimination, not
just sexual harassment, and amended the statute accordingly.7 ' While
it is sexual harassment hat has garnered the great bulk of media at-
tention, there are other forms of harassment-relating to race, na-
tional origin, and religion-that are every bit as destructive and
demeaning. Take, for example, cases in which African American em-
ployees find nooses left in their workspaces,7 2 or a person of Arab
descent is repeatedly called a terrorist.7 3
Even employment discrimination on the basis of sex or race with-
out harassment should not be the subject of secret settlements. When
69. N.Y. GEN. OcBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2018) ("Any such term or condition
must be provided to all parties, and the plaintiff shall have twenty-one days to consider
such term or condition. If after twenty-one days such term or condition is the plaintiffs
preference, such preference shall be memorialized in an agreement signed by all parties.
For a period of at least seven days following the execution of such agreement, the plaintiff
may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or be enforcea-
ble until such revocation period has expired.").
70. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-336(2) (McKinney 2019).
71. At legislative hearings held regarding this legislation, I testified at length about
the importance of addressing all forms of employment discrimination. Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace: Hearing Before N.Y. State Joint S. & Assemb., 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2019) (statement of Minna J. Kotkin, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School), available at
https://perma.cc/3RRY-GGPJ.
72. See Sana Siwolop, Nooses, Symbols of Race Hatred, at Center of Workplace Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES (Jul. 10, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/10/business/nooses-symbols-of-
race-hatred-at-center-of-workplace-lawsuits. html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://
perma.cc/DZH6-MF8X].
73. Selected List of Pending and Resolved Cases Alleging Religious and National Origin Dis-
crimination Involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian Communities, U.S.
EQuAL EMP. OPPoRTUNrrv COMMISSION (Jan. 2016), https://www.ecoc.gov/eeoc/litiga-
tion/selected/religion-nationalorigin.cfm [https://perma.cc/8ZLM-YTSR].
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a company, for example, refuses to promote a woman beyond a cer-
tain level, pays her less than her male counterparts, or terminates her
because she complains about discrimination, the settlement of her
claims should be available to the public. Otherwise, there is little to
deter a company from continuing these policies. Women can just be
paid off without disrupting the culture of discrimination in the
workplace.
Second, the statute effectively addresses the pre-dispute situation
relating to boilerplate NDAs. While the statute in effect simply reiter-
ates existing principles of anti-retaliation discussed above, it takes the
important step of ensuring that employees are aware of these protec-
tions. It has been widely reported, for example, that workers who ob-
served Harvey Weinstein's conduct were under the belief that
entering into NDAs prevented them from reporting to or speaking
with law enforcement authorities.7 4 This portion of the New York stat-
ute requires that NDAs be drafted to make these protections
explicit.75
Despite these positive elements, this statute undoubtedly will fail
to accomplish any significant change in the status quo due to the in-
clusion of "plaintiff1s preference." The statute simply does not address
the realities of settlement negotiations. It permits the employer's at-
torneys to make the following offer: "We will settle this matter for
$10,000 or for $100,000 if 'confidentiality is the plaintiff's prefer-
ence."' Moreover, there is nothing in the statute that prevents an em-
ployer from asserting that it will not settle the matter unless
confidentiality is the employee's preference.7 6 Clearly, an employee's
preference cannot be divorced from monetary considerations, and
nothing in the statute prevents this negotiating posture.
Third, the statute does not address at which stage of the dispute it
attaches. The statutory language in the New York General Obligations
Law, which governs contract law, refers to "the complainant."77 The
New York civil procedure code, New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules, similarly uses the term "plaintiff." 7 8 It could be argued that
74. Luchina Fisher, Harvey Weinstein Scandal Puts Nondisclosure Agreements in the Spot-
light, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2017, 4:46 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/harvey
-weinstein-scandal-puts-nondisclosure-agreements-spotlight/story?id=50680794 [https://
perma.cc/T7ZR-75HTJ.
75. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-336(2) (McKinney 2019).
76. In two cases that were settled by Brooklyn Law School's Employment Law Clinic,
which I direct, since the effective date of the statute, this was the employer's position.
77. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-336 (McKinney 2019).
78. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b (McKinney 2019).
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these provisions do not reach contractual agreements entered into
before any "claim or cause of action" is formally asserted.
Finally, it is unclear whether the confidentiality prohibition ex-
tends to the amount of the settlement rather than just to the "underly-
ing facts and circumstances." Other jurisdictions have explicitly
adopted the view that any monetary payment can remain confidential
even when the facts may be disclosed.79 Employers may take the posi-
tion that settlement amounts are still protected under this new
legislation.
B. California
California's statute, the Stand Together Against Non-disclosures
Act ("STAND"), took effect inJanuary 2019 and contains no provision
relating to "plaintiff preference."80 It explicitly pertains to settlement
agreements "related to a claim filed in a civil action or a complaint
filed in an administrative action,"81 thus eliminating any ambiguity as
to whether the law applies to contracts negotiated at the pre-filing
stage. It prohibits any provision within a settlement agreement that
"prevents the disclosure of factual information" related to the claim.
The subject areas of settlements that come within the statute's
purview are both broader and narrower than its New York counter-
part. Settlements need not fall within the confines of employment dis-
crimination protections, and no employer-employee relationship is
necessary to make the prohibition applicable.8 2 Thus, STAND applies
to acts that could be charged as criminal sexual assault, civil sexual
assault, or civil sexual harassment.83 This is a significant improvement
in that it addresses many of the #MeToo-type revelations, such as
those involving an aspiring actor seeking career help from an estab-
lished producer or a young entrepreneur seeking capital from an
investor.
The statute covers both sexual harassment and sex discrimination
in the workplace. However, unlike the New York law, STAND as
amended does not address other prohibited forms of employment dis-
crimination, such as race and religion. For the reasons discussed
79. See infra Part III.B.
80. Governor Brown Signs Leyva Bill Banning Secret Settlements in Sexual Assault and Har-
assment Cases, CAL. STATE SENATE, 20TH DISTRIcT (Sept. 30, 2018), https://sd20.senate.ca
.gov/news/2018-09-30-governor-signs-leyva-bill-banning-secret-settlements-sexual-assault-
and-harassment [https://perma.cc/QM9J-KMG2].
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1001 (West 2018).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (5) (2018).
83. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1001-02 (West 2018).
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above, this is a major failing of the legislation. Those subject to racial
discrimination should not be silenced any more than the victims of
sex discrimination.
The California statute contains a section that permits an agree-
ment that "shields the identity of the complainant and all facts that
could lead to the discovery of his or her identity, including pleadings
filed in court . . . at the request of the claimant."8 4 The motivation
behind this section is clearly to protect victims from having their iden-
tity revealed without their consent. If, for example, a settlement agree-
ment came to the attention of the press, the victim's name would not
be immediately discoverable.
Finally, the California law explicitly permits the enforcement of
NDAs that bar "the disclosure of the amount paid in settlement of a
claim,"85 thus eliminating the ambiguity found in New York's statute.
This aspect of the statute is problematic. The settlement amount is the
only means of discovering the justification or severity of the claims
made. There is clearly an immense difference between a sexual harass-
ment claim settled for five or ten thousand dollars and one for a mil-
lion dollars. If the facts of the claim are public, it appears
disingenuous to shield the settlement amount. Indeed, while this pro-
vision was presumably intended to protect the accused, it ignores the
fact that many claims are settled for what is regularly referred to as
"nuisance value."8 6 And when settlements are substantial, it allows the
payor to belittle the claims by suggesting that the parties only reached
an agreement o avoid the cost of litigation.
In addition, as I have previously argued, keeping settlement
amounts secret hampers the realistic assessment of claims in two
ways.8 7 First, complainants develop inflated expectations based on
press accounts of million-dollar settlements.88 Second, attorneys who
represent complainants cannot accurately value claims and provide
appropriate guidance to their clients when settlement data is structur-
ally concealed and impossible to discover.
84. § 1001(c).
85. § 1001(e).
86. David Rosenberg & Randy J. Kozel, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary judgment, 90 VA. L. REv. 1849 (2004).
87. Kotkin, supra note 41.
88. See Bill Chappell, Fox Will Pay Gretchen Carlson $20 Million To Settle Sexual Harass-
ment Suit, NPR (Sept 6, 2016, 9:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/
09/06/492797695/fox-news-will-pay-gretchen-carlson-20-million-to-settle-sexual-harass-
ment-suit [https://perma.cc/WN7V-P8R6].
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C. New Jersey
New Jersey enacted its statute addressing NDAs in March 2019.89
The new law states that any provision in an employment contract or
settlement agreement "which has the purpose or effect of concealing
the details relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation, or harass-
ment . . . shall be deemed against public policy and unenforceable
against a current or former employee who is a party to the contract or
settlement."9 0
To the extent such provisions remain in a settlement agreement,
they are unenforceable against the employee. If the employee chooses
to reveal claim specifics in a way that makes the culpable employer
"reasonably identifiable," the employer may likewise reveal formerly
confidential information.9 1 In that case, the non-disclosure provision
would also be unenforceable against the employer.92
Like the New York law, the New Jersey statute covers all forms of
employment discrimination, not just sexual harassment; but unlike
the California law, the New Jersey statute does not extend to sexual
assault outside of the employment relationship.9 3 It refers to employ-
ment contracts as well as settlement agreements,94 so it appears to
cover pre-dispute agreements without specifying whether the settle-
ment must be in the context of agency or court filings. It also contains
no explicit protection for settlement amounts, leaving the same ambi-
guity as the New York law.
One puzzling aspect of the law is it seems to suggest that NDA
language can still be included in a settlement agreement, even though
it is not enforceable at the employee's option. The statute states that
every settlement agreement that resolves discrimination, harassment,
or retaliation claims must include a "bold, prominently placed notice"
indicating that the confidentiality provision would be unenforceable
against an employer if the "employee publicly reveals sufficient details
of the claim so that the employer is reasonably identifiable."9 5 This
provision only serves to confuse the issue of confidentiality by sug-
89. Evandro Gigante & Arielle E. Kobetz, Proskauer, New Jersey Enacts Law Limiting
Non-Disclosure Obligations in Settlement Agreements (Mar. 21, 2019), https://
www.1awandtheworkplace.com/2019/03/new-jersey-enacts-law-limiting-non-disclosure-obli-
gations-in-settlement-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/KK95-5XS6].
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gesting that NDAs may be enforceable unless the employee speaks
out.
Conclusion
The #MeToo movement has shed light on the long-accepted
practice of silencing-through the use of NDAs-those who choose to
resolve legitimate claims against harassers and abusers. Employees
and other victims had no leverage in the negotiation of these agree-
ments and were powerless to insist that they be a matter of public
record. The power of these agreements is demonstrated by the fact
that there are almost no reported cases in which employers have
sought to enforce them, and no precedent suggests that they are in
fact not enforceable.
Apparently aware that the courts were not inclined to address the
concerns raised by NDAs, a number of state legislature have taken on
the issue. However, the enacted statutes leave a lot to be desired, as
discussed above.
With regard to employment contracts, agreements, manuals, and
separation agreements, legislatures should require that any non-dis-
closure provision include language informing employees that the pro-
vision does not bar them from reporting unlawful criminal conduct or
conduct that violates the anti-discrimination laws.
I suggest the following guidelines for all legislative efforts seeking
to address settlement confidentiality:
(1) The statute should bar the use of NDAs in relation to all em-
ployment discrimination claims that are filed with an agency
or a court;
(2) The statute should bar the use of NDAs in the non-employ-
ment context in cases of sexual assault or harassment;
(3) The statute should not permit an escape hatch based on so-
called "plaintiff's preference"; and
(4) The statute should not except from disclosure the amount of
the settlement.
It is only through the application of these principles that settle-
ment transparency will actually have a chance of success.
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